

## Chapter 13 Force Readiness

### Section I: Introduction

Unit readiness reflects a unit's ability to perform its doctrinal mission of achieving specified wartime objectives as structured. Unit capabilities are intended to increase as organizations are modernized. However, as an organization transitions from a lower to a higher level of capability during the modernization and reorganization process, readiness may initially be adversely affected, creating a direct relationship between readiness and force integration. Force integrators must ensure that the transition period is clearly defined, effectively managed, and accurately reported. One of the force integration goals, therefore, is to maximize capabilities while minimizing adverse effects on readiness. To achieve this goal, the focus of readiness management at all force levels should be on properly structured, equipped, manned, trained, sustained, deployed, stationed, and funded organizations.

### Section II: Readiness Management

#### FORCE READINESS

##### Purpose and Scope

Force readiness, as a military capability, is one of the six pillars of defense. It is a strategic management goal and a priority for force improvements. It requires that forces, organizations, units, weapon systems, and equipment have the ability to operate within their operational design parameters. Force readiness requires the total force to man, equip, and train organizations in peacetime while concurrently preparing to mobilize, deploy, fight, sustain, redeploy and demobilize forces in war within timelines.

##### Readiness Costs and Trade-offs

Force readiness is highly situational. It is composed of a complex group of interrelated processes that cannot be accurately measured by

any one means. This makes the measuring of readiness a difficult task because each individual element is made up of many tangible and intangible factors, some subjective and some quantifiable. In a peacetime environment, the only measure of return on investment that the Services can show is some level of force readiness, as deduced from analytical tools and other indicators.

Current force readiness must be balanced against other investment program needs such as RDT&E; procurement; and construction programs. It must also satisfy current readiness needs such as training, quality of life, spare parts, depot maintenance programs, and war reserve stockage.

Incremental costs of readiness increase as high levels of readiness are approached. At unit level, sustaining high readiness is cost-intensive due to increased demands for repair parts and supplies and training costs (ammunition and fuel), which all contribute to increased incremental costs. Because of the incremental costs of readiness and the response time of war plans, the Army maintains some units at a higher level of resources and readiness than others. Strategic lift should be correspondingly ready in increments. This stratification of readiness is done to allocate personnel, materiel, and dollars to achieve the greatest return on investment and to accept risk wherever possible.

##### Strategic Readiness Tasks

There are nine tasks that must be accomplished to achieve strategic readiness. Planners must:

- Ensure forces and supplies are sized and available for employment or deployment in a timely manner.
- Determine size and composition of forward-presence forces.

- Determine personnel and industrial mobilization requirements.
- Determine location and quantity of war reserve stocks.
- Determine transportation modes to move forces and supplies to aerial ports of embarkation.
- Size strategic lift to deploy forces and supplies.
- Anticipate means to receive and process forces and supplies in theaters of operations.
- Integrate the employment of forces in joint and combined operations.
- Determine means to expand and sustain the force.

The purpose for these strategic tasks is the timely deployment of units and supplies, the generation of sufficient combat power, and the sustainment of units in combat in accordance with the theater commander's campaign plan.

### **Force Readiness Factors**

The status of personnel and equipment can be objectively measured. However, morale, cohesion, or the quality of leadership are subjective determinations. The status of unit training is based on objective standards, but it requires a degree of subjectivity because an organization may be constrained in its ability to train on some mission-essential tasks in peacetime.

For instance, an estimate of force readiness would include-

- Unit status (of many units; aggregate judgment).
- Weapon systems capability (both qualitative and quantitative comparisons).

- Availability of facilities (judgmental).
- Availability of supplies (quantitative inventory; judgmental requirements).
- Relationships with allies (judgmental).
- Strategic intelligence capability (qualitative and quantitative).
- Unit cohesion, operational readiness, and training (judgmental based on some objective data).
- Civilian work force availability, experience, and ability to sustain the force (judgmental).
- Quality of soldier and family support services (judgmental).
- Civilian and military airlift capability (quantitative inventory; judgmental requirements).
- Civilian and military sealift capability (quantitative inventory; judgmental requirements).
- Civilian and military ground transportation capability (qualitative inventory; judgmental requirements).
- Line of communications preparation (quantitative inventory; judgmental requirements and locations).
- Availability of prestocked equipment (quantitative inventory; judgmental requirements).
- Mobilization capability (highly judgmental until executed).
- Availability of manpower for military and industry (highly judgmental).
- Capability to receive, process, and transport forces in theater (highly judgmental).

- Quality of senior leadership, strategic planning, and decisionmaking (qualitative judgment).
- Capability of the threat (qualitative and quantitative comparison; largely judgmental).
- Quality and morale of personnel (judgmental).

## UNIT READINESS

### Readiness Prioritization

The Department of the Army master priority list (DAMPL) prioritizes organizations according to deployability dates to sequence distribution of equipment and personnel. This "first to fight, first resourced" policy ensures that early deploying units are resourced fully. It allows shortages where minimum risk and maximum flexibility exist.

Based upon the DAMPL, units are assigned an authorized level of organization (ALO) commensurate with their primary mission and required availability date, which are determined from war plans. The ALO of an organization determines allocation of manpower spaces and the distribution of personnel. It is a statement of total resourcing. It correlates to operating tempo (OPTEMPO) and operations and maintenance funding.

### Unit Readiness Reporting Levels

Every organization reports overall status and the status of four measured resource areas by category level. The category level (C-1 through C-4) indicates the degree to which personnel and equipment requirements and maintenance and training standards have been achieved. Category levels do not project a unit's combat ability once committed to action. Rather, this status is measured against the resources and training required to undertake the wartime mission for which the unit is organized or designed. The four calculated category levels are-

- C-1. The unit possesses the required resources and is trained to undertake the full wartime mission for which it is organized or designed.
- C-2. The unit possesses the resources and has accomplished the training necessary to undertake the bulk of the wartime mission for which it is organized or designed.
- C-3. The unit possesses the resources and has accomplished the training necessary to undertake the major portions of the wartime mission for which it is organized or designed.
- C-4. The unit requires additional resources and/or training to undertake its wartime mission, but if the situation dictates, it may be directed to undertake portions of its wartime mission with resources on hand.

Normally the overall unit category level will be identical to the lowest level recorded in any of the unit's measured resource areas of personnel, equipment on hand, equipment readiness, and training. The overall unit category level may be upgraded or downgraded by the unit commander based on his judgment and experience; however, the computed status of each measured resource area must be reported as calculated.

### Unit Equipment Requirements and Authorizations

Equipment requirements and authorizations are categorized by equipment readiness codes (ERCs) that specify, by line item number (LIN), the relation of a specific item of equipment to the organization's mission. ERC "A" LINs are primary weapons or equipment essential to mission accomplishment. ERC "B" LINs include auxiliary equipment that supports or replaces inoperative primary items. ERC "C" LINs are administrative support equipment. Pacing items (ERC "P") are those ERC "A" items that define the organization's doctrinal capability (tank, infantry fighting vehicle, attack helicopter).

The Army equipment distribution strategy specifies a minimum C-3 status for all units. The principal elements of the strategy are to-

- Fill pacing items (including associated support items of equipment to 100% for all organizations).
- Fill selected organizations to 100%.
- Fill forward-deployed forces and major combat forces deploying by C+30 to C-2.
- Fill remaining forces to C-3.
- As assets permit, fill all organizations to 100%.

### **Section III: Measuring Unit Status**

Unit status reflects the combat readiness condition of a unit at a given point in time. As noted earlier, this status is reported in the areas of personnel, equipment on hand, equipment readiness, and training. It is calculated by comparing wartime requirements specified in the unit authorization document for personnel and equipment to assets on hand.

The National Military Command Center maintains the capability and status of US forces assigned to support the Joint Chief of Staff operations plans. It also provides information to the National Command Authorities.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Status of Resource and Training System (SORTS) tracks changes in unit locations, command lines, and mobilization and deployment status. Its primary purpose is to provide unit status information that can be used to make operational decisions through integration into the Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES). The Army input to SORTS is through unit status reports (USRs).

## **ARMY READINESS MANAGEMENT SYSTEM**

### **Commander-in-Chief's Preparedness Assessment Report.**

The requirement for military capability reporting is accomplished using the commander-in-chief's preparedness assessment report (CSPAR). Status reporting is accomplished in the SORTS within the Army Readiness Management System as portrayed in Figure 13-1.


The CSPAR is prepared biannually to assess the ability of apportioned forces to carry out assigned missions. The report assesses ability to deploy; materiel sustainability; host nation support; combat service support structure; nuclear, biological, and chemical defense posture; and support by other commands and logistic agencies. These CSPARs are fundamental in providing a balanced picture of the force.

### **Unit Status Reporting System**

The USR provides the status of Army units to the JCS and NCA. It is used as a management tool at all force levels to identify and assess conditions and trends affecting organizations. These include factors that degrade unit status; differences between minimum mission-essential wartime requirements, authorizations, and assets on hand; and resource allocation requirements (Figure 13-2, Unit Status Reporting Channels for Active Army and US Army Reserve, p. 13-6; Unit Status Reporting Channels for the Army National Guard are shown in Figure 13-3, p. 13-7).

The USR provides information to MACOM commanders in summary form that depicts trends and identifies units not attaining category levels equal to their ALO. It also allows management-by-exception in correcting problems.

The US Army Reserve Command (USARC) monitors the status of all CONUS US Army Reserve (USAR) units in coordination with each Continental US Army (CONUSA). The USARC manages and allocates the necessary resources




**Figure 13-1**  
**Army Readiness Management System**

to maintain an acceptable level of readiness. It coordinates status reporting of all USAR units and implements, reviews, and provides guidance on Forces Command (FORSCOM) readiness policies. The CONUSAs are focused on improving readiness and mobilization capabilities of reserve component units. The ability of mobilization stations to bring C-4 units to an acceptable level of readiness for deployment is assessed. Based on USR analyses, training reports, and command readiness inspections, CONUSAs prioritize units, evaluate selected units, and conduct readiness management forums.

Although corps are not in the formal unit status reporting chain, corps commanders use USRs to assess trends and factors that degrade readiness and allow resourcing and prioritization

decisions to be made.

Division, separate brigade, regiment, and group commanders use unit status reporting as one of many management tools to determine whether subordinate commanders are using available resources effectively. The composite report submitted by commanders at this force level gives an overall assessment of the status of their commands. These commanders also provide narrative comments to highlight areas that require resolution at corps, or higher, level. USRs of round-up and round-out organizations are submitted to the parent organization commander for inclusion in the composite report. The USRs of direct support organizations also provide the supported commander with valuable information and insights concerning the warfighting capability of his force.



**Figure 13-2**  
Unit Status Reporting Channels for Active Army and US Army Reserve

The USR gives the commander at any level a finite measurement of his unit's status and evolution over time. The commander's comments are used to highlight situations where special attention, intensive management, or higher command echelon involvement is needed.

#### **Section IV: Planning and Executing Organizational Change**

As previously noted, organizations that are activating, converting, or reorganizing are undergoing a series of activities that are disruptive and turbulent. The process of structuring, equipping, manning, training, deploying, and stationing an organization or its subordinate units requires that leaders focus on the execution of change. The time allocated to accomplish activation, conversion, or reorganization starts when organization capability and readiness are first affected. It continues

until the transition is complete and the unit is C-3 or higher in personnel, equipment on hand, equipment readiness, and training.

#### **TRANSITION PERIOD ACTIVITIES**

Events that define the transition period are those in which capability and readiness degradation and enhancement are quantifiable (Figure 13-4, Organization Capability in Transition, p. 13-8). Turn-in of major end items identifies the start of transition. This may be incident to new equipment hand-off or inactivation of subordinate units as part of restructuring. Completion of a training evaluation allows mission-essential tasks to be assessed and terminates the transition period.

Readiness goals, in terms of minimum acceptable category levels to be achieved at the end of the transition period, must be established




Figure 13-3  
 Unit Status Reporting Channels for Army National Guard

in the planning process. These goals should consider loss of trained personnel and key leaders subsequent to completion of the transition due to normal attrition, release of personnel extended to accomplish transition, relief from excepted unit status, and return to fair share manning. The impact of personnel loss may be protracted over several months.

During the transition period, the organization is not prepared to undertake the wartime mission for which it is organized or designed. If the situation dictates, it may be directed to undertake portions of its wartime mission with resources on hand. Organizations in transition report C-5 in affected commodity areas and C-5 overall when-

- Reorganizing or converting.
- In HQDA-directed cadre status.
- Activating or inactivating.

- Not manned or equipped, but required in wartime.
- Organized as training units that could be tasked to perform a wartime mission.
- Structured at ALO 4 or below.

#### MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT ESTIMATES

Commanders of organizations in transition must quantify the organizations' mission accomplishment estimates as capability increases over time. These estimates include objective and subjective assessments in order to articulate, by percentage, the capability of the organizations to accomplish their doctrinal missions.

Unless previously approved, organizations should not execute reorganization, activation, or conversion that is projected to result in a C-4 category level upon completion of the transition period. Organizational assessments will begin




Figure 13-4  
Organization Capability in Transition

evaluating projected unit status under a new authorization document. This will identify and resolve problems in attaining at least a C-3 readiness status upon transition to a new structure and/or new materiel systems. Issues that cannot be resolved must be communicated to MACOM and HQDA as soon as practical.

#### FORCE VALIDATION PROCESS

The force validation process assesses organizations activating or converting to ensure that minimum readiness standards are met on the effective date of change (EDATE). This process depends on MACOM-level assessments of organizations undergoing change. HQDA may change the EDATE for activating, converting, or reorganizing units that are not projected to meet minimum readiness standards.

Failure to provide authorized resources to organizations at the EDATE results in degradation of capability. "Instant unreadiness" is the condition that occurs when personnel and/or equipment are required and authorized, but are not on hand at the unit level on EDATE.

#### Summary

Readiness measures the peacetime output of the total force. Unit status reporting provides the chain of command with current information for plans and operations. Readiness measurement can also ascertain whether or not the resources provided achieve the expected readiness levels of the force and allows for management-by-exception. The integration of new capabilities into the force affects readiness. It is a cost of modernization and must be managed to ensure that readiness degradation is limited in impact and time.